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Intellectual Property, Technology, and Justice 
Prof. David W. Opderbeck 
Spring 2018 
Daniela Caro-Esposito 
Copyright: Global Dissemination through the Internet and Compulsory Licensing 
I. Introduction 
Today, other countries never feel quite so far away. Communication between people of one 
nation and another can be facilitated quite easily. Trains, boats, and planes have made traveling 
from one country to another very manageable. The Internet can make communication 
instantaneous. Ironically, intellectual property cannot travel quite as easily. A close friend of 
mine, who is from the United States, is currently in England earning her master’s degree. When 
she was feeling homesick, she tried to watch some American television shows through websites 
like Amazon Prime, Hulu and Netflix. In place of her preferred choice of programming, she 
received an error message informing her that the video was not available due to geographical 
licensing restrictions. Although being denied a certain television shows does not sound like a 
serious problem, it is an example of how various copyright laws are inhibiting the free flow of 
intellectual property between nations. The free flow of cultural works in some ways determines 
the financial wellbeing of cultures, and this article argues that with the current high minimum 
standards mandated in international treaties, the neglect in harmonizing copyright laws for the 
Internet, many nations cannot fairly compete in the intellectual market on a global scale. Today, 
the Internet connects the world, yet international copyright law have yet to address it.  
This article focuses on the current state of international copyright law and how the disconnect 
created by different copyright policies around the world seem to disproportionately favor some 
distributors over others. Despite various efforts to harmonize copyright laws, there remains 
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uneven protection globally, which results in works being protected disproportionately on an 
international scale. Even when countries offer the same terms of protection, the sharing of works 
is difficult due to high fees. This creates problems in terms of the dissemination of different ideas 
around the world. Additionally, the current attempts at international copyright law do not address 
the Internet, exacerbating the problem. In essence, this article argues that the lack of complete 
harmonization, the high minimum standards of protections in international treaties, and the 
failure to address the Internet in international copyright law disrupts the goals and purposes of 
the United States Copyright Act. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution 
grants Congress the authority “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.” 1 To achieve this goal, creations must be shared.  
In order to truly promote the progress of science and useful arts, there must be a global effort. 
To accomplish this, harmonization of copyright laws across nations must be achieved. When 
there are different copyright licensing laws across borders, culture cannot flow freely. One 
impediment is the high cost required for licensing a protected work. A specific example used to 
demonstrate the difficulties with the current state of international copyright law will be programs 
offered on Amazon Prime, an Internet website that allows subscribers to stream television shows, 
some of which are permitted within the United States but not permitted in England (due to 
licensing restrictions). Without compulsory licenses, access to television shows around the globe 
becomes difficult for Internet service transmitters, such as Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon Prime.  
                                                          
1 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution 
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This article first outlines the history and development of the current copyright laws existing 
in the United States, in section II. Next, section III outlines international copyright law as 
developed over time and as it exists currently. Initially bilateral agreements governed copyright 
laws between nations.2 But, today, copyright is governed through various international 
agreements and treaties, such as the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the TRIPs Agreement.3 Section IV will then outline a shirt history 
of how cable broadcasters were granted the right to compulsory licensing in the United States 
and compares them to Internet streamers. Next, section V provides a short overview as to how 
the high fees associated with copyrighted works affect developing countries. Finally, section VI 
argues that without harmonization, the spread of culture across boarders cannot be accomplished, 
and that this ultimately frustrates the goal of United States copyright as stated in the United 
States Constitution. As a specific example, this section will use the licensing restrictions 
preventing the sharing of culture through television shows offered via Internet streaming, and 
propose that compulsory licensing may alleviate some of the difficulty in this area.  
II. United States Copyright; History and Development 
a. The Statute of Anne 
Copyright law in the United States was originally drafted after the copyright statutes in 
England, specifically after the Statute of Anne. The Statute of Anne is the first statute of all time 
to recognize the rights of authors, as opposed to only printers and booksellers. 4 Some important 
provisions of the Statute of Anne are the granting to an author (1) the exclusive right, for 
                                                          
2 Roberto Garza Barbosa, Revisiting International Copyright Law, 8 Barry L. Rev. 43, 45 (2007). 
3 Id.  
4 Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, 3 (Robert C. Clark et al. 
eds., 9th ed. 2017). 
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fourteen years, to print their work; (2) and an additional fourteen years of protection if the author 
was still living at the conclusion of the first term of fourteen years. 5 Additionally, the statute 
imposed a registration requirement that mandated that an author “register title at Stationers’ Hall, 
and deposit nine copies at official libraries.”6 Finally, the statute also included penalties for any 
individual found to have unlawfully copied a copyrighted work: “every such Offender or 
Offenders shall forfeit one Penny for Every Sheet which shall be found in his, her, or their 
Custody.”7 
The Statute of Anne greatly influenced the development of United States Copyright, and 
therefore is an important landmark in the history of copyright law as a whole.  
b. The First United States Copyright Statute: The Act of 1790 
The Act of 1790, like the Statute of Anne, assured authors fourteen years of protection for 
works such as a map, chart, or a book. 8 Also similar to the Statute of Anne, the author could 
gain protection by: 
(1) Recording the title, prior to publication, in the register book of the clerk’s office of the 
district court where the author or proprietor resided; 
(2) Publishing a copy of the record so made in one or more newspapers for four weeks; and 
(3) Depositing a copy of the work itself in the office of the Secretary of State within six 
months after publication9 
 
c. Modern United States Copyright Acts; 1909 and 1976 
                                                          
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 7 
9 Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, 7 (Robert C. Clark et al. 
eds., 9th ed. 2017). 
5 
 
i. The 1909 Copyright Act 
The 1909 Copyright Act was the result of multiple bills, all consisting of different viewpoints 
and conflicting interests.10 Due to differing viewpoints, the entire act was difficult to understand. 
11 However, the 1909 Copyright Act was a step towards improvement from the previous 
copyright laws and provided the following:  
(1) for published works, copyright was declared to begin with the publication of the work 
with copyright notice (rather than from the date of filing the title); (2) statutory copyright 
was made available for unpublished works designed for exhibition, performance or oral 
delivery; (3) the renewal term of protection was extended by 14 years, thus increasing the 
maximum possible copyright term to 56 years, and (4) the certificate of registration was 
declared to be prima facie evidence of the facts recorded therein in relation to any work.12  
Notably, this Act placed emphasis on formalities, such as a notice requirement.13 If an author 
failed to fulfill the notice requirement, the work was forfeited to the public domain. 14 One the 
other hand, fulfilling the requirement came with many benefits: increased protection from state 
to federal for 28 years, and allowed for an additional 28 year renewal, potentially totaling the 
protection to 56 years. 15 
ii. The 1976 Copyright Act 
The 1976 Copyright Act provides the basis for current copyright law, and was made in an 
effort to update the preexisting copyright act to accommodate new technology.16 One notable 
provision was the imposition of copyright liability on cable television systems and jukeboxes 
                                                          
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 8 
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14  Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, 8 (Robert C. Clark et al. 
eds., 9th ed. 2017). 
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
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that use copyrighted material (subject to compulsory licenses).17 Other notable provisions 
include the federal system of copyright protection for both published and unpublished works, 
which explicitly preempts state law, and recognition of fair use limitations.18 
In 1988, Congress passed the “Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,” and the 
following amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act were made: (1) the term of protection for 
copyrighted works was changed from the life of the author plus fifty years, to the life of the 
author plus seventy years; and (2) works authored by an anonymous or pseudonymous author, as 
well as works made for hire, are now protected for ninety-five years from publication, as 
opposed to the previous term of seventy-five years.19 
III. International Copyright 
a. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
International copyright policies and protection have developed throughout stages. The 
initial stage of copyright protection between different nations was the bilateral agreement, or 
what can also be referred to as bilateralism.20 Most bilateral agreements functioned as a product 
of reciprocity.21  Reciprocity can be put into one of two categories: formal or material.22  
Formal reciprocity requires that the two nations protect each other’s citizens in the same 
way that they protect their own citizens.23 Material reciprocity requires that the nation treat the 
                                                          
17 Id. at 8 
18 Id.  
19 Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, 150 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. eds., 9th ed. 2017). 
20Roberto Garza Barbosa, Revisiting International Copyright Law, 8 Barry L. Rev. 43, 44-45 (2007). 
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 45  
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foreigner the same way that the foreigner is treated in their nation of origin.24 Most bilateral 
agreements were later replaced with multilateral agreements, but some are still in place today.25 
The United Kingdom had difficulty entering into bilateral agreements with the United States, as 
the United States only provided copyright protection to its nationals or residents.26 It was 
pressure from both American and British authors that eventually led the United States to enact 
the International Copyright Act of 1891.27 
b. The International Copyright Act of 1891 
The International Copyright Act of 1891 granted copyright protection rights to foreigners 
for the first time.28 However, in order for foreigners to have protection in the United States 
through this act, they were required to comply with strict formality requirements such as title, 
deposit, and notice (all referring back to older copyright statutes, such as the Statute of Anne).29 
In practice it did not function as true international policy. The real result was more protection for 
American works, and more access to unprotected foreign works for Americans.30 As a result, 
better international policy was called for. This ultimately led to the Berne Convention.31 
c. The Berne Convention 
i. Background 
                                                          
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, 10 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. eds., 9th ed. 2017). 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
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The Bern Convention, ratified in 1886, is meant to be a compromise among its various 
member nations.32 At present, 170 nations are signatories of the Berne Convention.33 For the 
most part, the Berne Convention is comprised of minimum term requirements with national 
treatment, which is designed to still allow each nation some autonomy over their national 
copyright policies.34 National treatment means that foreigners get the same protection as a citizen 
of that country would get, instead of only getting the same protection as in their home country.35 
Currently, the Berne Convention has gone through six revisions, the most recent taking place in 
1971, known as the Paris Act.36 The Berne Convention extends protection without the rigid 
formalities imposed by the International Copyright Act of 1891.37 However, in some ways, this 
international attempt to harmonize copyright impedes the very goal by relying on minimum 
standards:  
For example, the minimum term of copyright under the Berne Convention is the life of 
the author plus fifty years (life plus fifty). Unlike other aspects of the treaty, countries 
that have a longer term of protection are not required to extend the term of protection for 
works whose home country maintains a shorter term. The United States amended its 
copyright statute to life plus seventy in response to a similar extension by the European 
Union. Many commentators argue this leads to a race to the bottom (or top) in the level of 
protection. As soon as one country increases the level of copyright protection, other 
nations have an incentive to "keep up" in order to enjoy full protection in the country that 
took the first step.38 
 
The minimum standards has created uneven protection internationally as a result. 
                                                          
32 Matt Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity in International Copyright, 43 IDEA 607,  
620 (2003). 
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 621-622 
36 Id.  
37 Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, 10 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. eds., 9th ed. 2017) 
38 Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity in International Copyright, supra Note 32, at  
622. 
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In 1908, the Berne Convention was revised to include a provision that rejected any 
formality requirement.39 The United States did not initially join the Berne Convention, due to 
preclusion from the 1909 Copyright Act.40 Many policies in the 1909 Copyright Act conflicted 
with the Berne Convention, specifically the formality requirements of the 1909 Copyright Act. It 
was not until the United States enacted the 1976 Copyright Act that it was possible for it to join 
the Berne Convention.41  
Important provisions in the Berne Act were added through revisions over the years, one 
being the addition of moral rights, which were included in the 1928 Rome Act.42 Today, there is 
a divide on the policy of moral rights. Some nations place importance on these rights, while 
others, like the United States, do not:  
Each nation has its own copyright laws designed to promote specific cultural values, 
social norms, and economic goals. Some nations, particularly France and Germany, place 
heavier emphasis on the "moral rights" of authors while others, such as the United States, 
focus more on the utilitarian goal of promoting the production of creative works.43 
As a result, moral rights were a topic of great debate during the Berne adherence for the United 
States.44 It appears that the United States enacted the Visual Rights Act of 1990 in an attempt to 
grant some moral rights in accordance with the Berne Convention, while still maintaining its 
utilitarian approach to copyright as a whole.45 These different approaches to copyright 
                                                          
39 Roberto Garza Barbosa, Revisiting International Copyright Law, 8 Barry L. Rev. 43, 48 (2007). 
40 Matt Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity in International Copyright, 43 IDEA 607,  
623 (2003). 
41 Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, 11 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. eds., 9th ed. 2017). 
42 Barbosa, Revisiting International Copyright Law, supra Note 39, at 48. 
43 Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity in International Copyright, supra Note 40, at 608  
44 Gorman, Ginsburg & Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, supra Note 41, at 781. 
45 Id.  
10 
 
throughout the world have determined the free flow of materials that may be in the public 
domain of some countries, but not others.46 
ii. Problems with the Current Berne Convention 
Despite the great progress made with the Berne Convention, not all of its provisions are 
successful in harmonizing copyright. For example, the Berne Convention has what is referred to 
as the rule of the shorter term: 
Under the rule of the shorter term, Country B will not apply its longer copyright term to a 
work whose copyright has expired in Country A, the country of the work's origin, but will 
instead apply the origin country's shorter term. Having omitted the rule from its limited 
adoption of the Berne Convention, the United States protects many works whose 
copyrights have expired in their countries of origin.47 
This rule then perpetuates the problem of uneven protection throughout the nations adhering to 
the Berne Convention. By only mandating minimum standards, there is the potential for each and 
every member nation to afford different terms of protection. Although the rule of shorter term 
may seek to alleviate this issue, it ultimately may add to it.  
 Additionally, the current version of the Berne Convention does not take into account the 
financial impediments associated with the spread of copyrighted work. The convention does not 
provide for a system of compulsory licenses, and some scholars argue that such a system will aid 
in the harmonization of copyright law.48 
iii. The Internet and the Berne Convention 
Notably absent from current international treaties is a copyright regulatory scheme 
tailored towards the Internet. The Internet connects different nations of the world almost 
                                                          
46 Robert Spoo, The Uncoordinated Public Domain, 35 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 107, 113 (2016). 
47 Id. 118  
48 Id. 146-147  
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seamlessly. As a result members of the Berne Convention are often faced with choice-of-law 
problems when an infringement occurs via the Internet.49 Theoretically, if copyright laws were 
the same internationally, the choice-of-law problem would cease to exist.50 Marketa Trimble, 
associate professor of law at William S. Boyd School of Law, summarized the issue as follows: 
Copyright vests automatically in . . .  at a minimum, all . . .  countries that are parties to 
the Berne Convention. When a work is made available on the Internet, that act can 
infringe copyright in multiple or even in all of the countries in which the content can be 
viewed, downloaded, or streamed. Of course countries' laws differ, and there can be no 
infringement committed in countries where the work falls outside copyright protection . . 
. , or in countries in which the act is not considered infringing . . . . Regardless of whether 
the laws of all countries hold the work protected and the act infringing, the possibility 
exists that all countries' laws could apply simultaneously.51 
There are a number of solutions analyzed by Professor Trimble for this problem. Unfortunately, 
all come with positive and negative consequences.  
The first proposed solution discussed by Professor Trimble is a uniform Internet 
copyright regime that applies internationally.52 The difficulty with this solution is that it may be 
an onerous task to develop a regime that all the signatories of the Berne Convention would agree 
to.53 Additionally, if and when that is accomplished, each signatory’s interpretation of the laws 
may differ.54 
Professor Trimble then addressed solutions to conflict-of-law problems, the first being a 
localization approach: 
The localization approach to solving the multiplicity problem seeks to identify an 
occurrence or fact that can be understood as the place of a tortious activity and be 
                                                          
49 Marketa Trimble, The Multiplicity of Copyright Laws on the Internet, 25 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 
339 (2015). 
50 Id. at 356  
51 Id. at 356-357  
52 Id. at 354  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
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localized in a single place. One possible place is the place from which the allegedly 
infringing activity emanates, or "[t]he point of origin of the alleged infringement"--the 
place where the alleged infringer acted. . . Another localization might be in the domicile 
of the copyright owner; the theory for this approach is that the place of the tortious 
activity is the place in which the entire harm is concentrated--the place where the harm is 
internalized by the copyright owner.55 
The problem with the localization approach is that an infringer can potentially choose where the 
infringement occurs, and the copyright owner can choose where the harm will be internalized by 
choosing the location to register the copyright.56 Here, the Berne Convention’s approach of 
minimum standards comes into play, since some nations offer longer terms of protection than 
others.57 
 The next solution discussed is the factors approach. Here, courts “will choose a single 
applicable copyright law . . . based on a weighing of multiple factors.”58 Professor Trimble 
explained that, in theory, it would allow courts to use the factors to select the law of the country 
that “in a given case has the prevailing interest in having its copyright law applied . . . .”59 The 
down-side to this approach, however, is the legal uncertainty in each case due to the weighing of 
the factors.60 
d. The Universal Copyright Convention 
Many nations did not ratify the Berne Convention due to the strict minimum standards it 
required.61 The goal of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) was to create a uniform 
system of copyright protection for nations that had not ratified the Berne Convention.62 The 
                                                          
55 Id. at 359-360  
56 Id. at 360  
57 Id. at 360 
58 Id. at 358  
59 Id. at 378  
60 Id.  
61 Roberto Garza Barbosa, Revisiting International Copyright Law, 8 Barry L. Rev. 43, 52 (2007). 
62 Id. at 52 
13 
 
minimum standards of the UCC were lower than that of the Berne Convention: “The minimum 
standards for protection were only those necessary for the achievement of ‘adequate and 
effective protection.’”63 However, the UCC included a clause that prevented the necessity of 
resigning from the Berne Convention in order to join the UCC; a nation could belong to both.64 
The most recent version of the UCC state that when the terms of the UCC conflict with the terms 
of the Berne Convention, the Berne Convention controls.65 Some important differences to note 
between the Berne Convention and the UCC are that (1) the UCC does not grant moral rights; (2) 
the UCC does allow nations to condition copyright protection on the author’s fulfillment of 
formalities; and (3) that the term of protection granted by the UCC is significantly shorter than 
that granted by the Berne Convention (the basic term is the life of the author plus twenty-five 
years, or twenty-five years from publication. 29 U.C.C. Art. IV.2(a)).66 
e. The WIPO Copyright Treaty 
The WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 is an agreement under the Berne Convention that is 
designed to apply to digital works.67 The treaty proclaims that computer programs and the 
selection and arrangement of compilation of data or other materials are protectable.68 Any party 
contracting to the agreement will be required to comply with the substantive provisions of the 
1971 (Paris) Act of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(1886), even if they are not a signatory to the Berne Convention.69 In addition to the rights 
                                                          
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Copyright and the Public Domain § 10.01 
67 WIPO Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/  (last visited March. 30, 
2018). 
68 Copyright and the Public Domain § 10.01 
69 WIPO Intellectual Property Organization ; Summary of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996), 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/summary_wct.html (last visited March. 30, 2018). 
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granted to computer programs and compiled data that are taken from the Berne Convention, the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty provides that these works are also granted the right of distribution, the 
right of rental and the right of communication to the public.70 In addition, the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty requires a minimum term of fifty years of protection for digital works.71  
f. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs 
Agreement) 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or as it is more 
commonly known, TRIPs Agreement, was signed in 1994 by the United States alongside 106 
other nations. 72 The agreement is an international trade agreement that addresses intellectual 
property, such as copyright.73 Like the WIPO Copyright Treaty, TRIPs adopts the substantive 
provisions of the Berne Convention.74 Importantly, like the UCC, TRIPs does not grant any 
moral rights.75 It does, however, provide protection to both computer programs and compiled 
data.76 TRIPs grants the following protection to some digital works: 
TRIPs also gives authors of computer programs, and producers of sound recordings and 
films control over the commercial rental of their works to the public. 47 TRIPs, Art. 11. 
Performers are given protection from unauthorized recording and broadcast of live 
performances (bootlegging) for fifty years. 48 TRIPs, Arts. 14.1., 14(5). Broadcasting 
organizations are given control over the use of their broadcast signals for at least twenty 
years, 49 TRIPs, Arts. 14.3., 14(5). and producers of sound recordings are given a 
minimum fifty year reproduction right. 50 TRIPs, Arts. 14.2., 14(5).77 
                                                          
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Copyright and the Public Domain § 10.01 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
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TRIPs differs from other copyright treaties in its enforcement of copyright protection.78 
Treaties like the Berne Convention offer protection to private parties against each other across 
different nations, but if a nation does not enforce the protection, there is no international 
redress.79 Conversely, TRIPs is enforced by the World Trade Organization, and as a result, can 
be enforced on a “country-to-country basis.”80 Enforcement can occur in the form of trade 
sanctions on countries that fail to adhere to the protection requirements required by TRIPs 
agreement.81 
Additionally, TRIPs addresses compulsory licenses regarding patents in Article 31, Other 
Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder. 82 Although not referred to explicitly, this 
Article of the agreement allows for unauthorized use of patents, primarily pharmaceutical 
patents. Members of the World Trade Organization have discretion in determining whether to 
issue compulsory licenses for medications, however less developed nations are still underserved 
with the current provisions in this area.83 Madhavi Sunder, author of From Goods to a Good Life, 
argues that underdeveloped countries ultimately depend on compulsory licenses for patented 
medications, both for importation and exportation.84 Ultimately, Sunder argues that developing 
countries need lower terms of protection in patents for financial survival.85 This notion can be 
applied across the board of intellectual property rights.  
IV. Television Licensing: Cable Providers versus Internet Service Transmitters 
                                                          
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 World Trade Organization; Part II — Standards concerning the availability, scope and use of Intellectual Property 
Rights, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm (last visited Arp. 25, 2018). 
83 Madhavi Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life 192 (2012). 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
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a. Cable Providers 
Copyright grants many different exclusive rights to an author of a work, one of which is the 
right to public performance and public display.86 The statute in the present Copyright Act (1976) 
grants two types of public performance or display rights: (1) performance or display at a location 
accessible to the public, or a location accessible to a large number of people “outside of a normal 
circle of a family or its social acquaintances”; (2) a performance through a “a transmission, such 
as a radio or television broadcast or an Internet transmission.”87 Without authorization from a 
copyright owner, a performance through a transmission of television broadcast or Internet would 
constitute an infringement on the copyright owner’s exclusive right to public performance and 
public display.88 
Public performance rights were added late in the history of statutory copyright 
development.89 The first categories of works granted this right by Congress were dramatic works 
and musical compositions, in 1856 and 1897, respectively.90 The 1909 Copyright Act was 
drafted with the public performance right in connection with dramatic works, and had to later be 
amended to include musical compositions.91 However, questions concerning the definition and 
scope of “performance” often arose. For this reason, the current 1976 Copyright Act includes 
more guidance as to the meaning of “performance”:  
§ 101. Definitions 
                                                          
86 Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, 49 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. eds., 9th ed. 2017). 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 873 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
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To “perform” a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by 
means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.92 
 As technology developed, performances were easier for lay people to conduct. For 
example, the invention of the VRC and VTR gave consumers the ability to record cable shows 
and watch them at their own convenience. In the landmark case, Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., the court was faced with the question of whether a company who 
supplies the technology that enables infringing activity is liable for copyright infringement.93 The 
court determined that since the technology was primarily used for non-infringing activity, Sony, 
the provider, was not liable for any customers using the technology unlawfully.94 In discussing 
the infringing and non-infringing uses, the court described a concept known as time-shifting: 
“Time-shifting enables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss because they are not 
at home, are occupied with other tasks, or are viewing a program on another station at the time of 
a broadcast that they desire to watch.”95 The court explained that some copyright owners of 
shows available on the technology gave permission for users to copy the material, and so the 
time-shifting of these specific programs was authorized, and thus non-infringing.96 With regards 
to the programs which copying was not authorized by the copyright owner, the court concluded 
that even unauthorized uses of copyrighted work can be non-infringing.97 Here, the time-shifting 
use was for private and non-commercial enjoyment, and did not infringe on the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights. 98  
                                                          
9217 U.S. Code § 101 - Definitions  
93 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 779  
96 Id. at 774  
97 Id. at 792  
98 Id.  
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 Technology is constantly changing, and now consumers have the ability to view 
television through Internet transmissions. One method of accomplishing this is through “Sling” 
technology, which uses a computer chip to transcode audiovisual information from satellite or 
from a recorded television program, to allow a consumer to bring the television program 
anywhere they want. 99 Some cable providers offer this product to their consumers. The court 
was presented with this technology in Fox Broadcasting Co. v. DISH Network, LLC just a few 
years ago (in 2015). In Fox Broadcasting Co. v. DISH Network, LLC, DISH Network offered 
consumers a feature it called “Hopper with Sling,” which allowed subscribers to watch television 
programs they had previously recorded on their DVR over the Internet, which gave them more 
mobility.100 The court addressed the scope of public performance in this case, and found that 
Hopper with Sling did not infringe on Fox’s right of public performance.101 The court reasoned 
that since DISH had a license from Fox that allowed for transmission of Fox’s programs to its 
subscribers, neither DISH nor a subscriber not infringing by accessing a program that they 
already possessed, even if they are accessing it from another location.102 Furthermore, although 
subscribers do transmit and perform the programs within the meaning of Section 101 of the 
Copyright Act, they do not do so publicly: 
When an individual DISH subscriber transmits programming rightfully in her possession 
to another device, that transmission does not travel to “a large number of people who are 
unknown to each other.” The transmission travels either to the subscriber herself or to 
someone in her household using an authenticated device.103  
                                                          
99Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, Copyright Cases and Materials, 895-96 (Robert C. Clark 
et al. eds., 9th ed. 2017).  
100 Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 1162  
19 
 
It is important to note, however, that the defendants in these cases are or are similar to 
cable providers, and are licensees of the television programs. The issue the court focused on in 
the above cases was whether the transmission of the licensed programs to transcribers beyond the 
scheduled program time infringed the copyright holder’s right to performance. The cable 
providers first transmitted the program, and the consumer then recorded the program, and used 
Sling technology to later use it on mobile devices and computers.  
Notably, under §111 of the Copyright Act, a “cable system” is eligible for a compulsory 
license. The compulsory license allows the cable provider to retransmit a performance that was 
first broadcast by someone else, without having to get authorization from the copyright holder.104 
In return, the cable provider simply pays a statutory fee to the Copyright Office and is thus 
protected from infringement liability.105  
This right was not always provided to cable, and was the result of a much needed 
compromise between cable networks and copyright holders.106 Cable television debuted in the 
1950s, and functioned as a result of a community antenna system, in which a community shared 
a large antenna and received signals from local television broadcast stations.107 At this time, 
copyright holders would benefit from the cable broadcasters because the license fee they 
received factored in the profit made from advertisements.108 Advertising profit varied based on 
viewership. However, as cable began importing distant signals, the dynamic began to change. 
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Local broadcasters were now competing with national broadcasters, and as their viewership 
decreased, copyright owners began to lose purchasers of copyright licenses.109 
Overtime, various solutions were attempted, such as must-carry, nonduplication, and 
exclusivity rules, but with little success.110 This lead to the “Great Compromise” of 1972, which 
contained four main provisions: (1) syndicated exclusivity; (2) distant signal carriage rules; 
broadcasters’ right to sue for copyright infringement if a cable operator violated an exclusivity 
agreement; and (4) cable copyright liability, to be administered through a compulsory license 
system.111 The latter two provisions were then adopted by Congress as part of the Copyright Act 
of 1976.112  
The Act’s inclusion of the latter two provisions of the compromise are found in sections 
111, 501, and 510.113 The Act states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c), the secondary transmission to 
the public of a primary transmission embodying a performance or display of a work is 
actionable as an act of infringement under section 501, and is fully subject to the 
remedies provided by sections 502 through 506 and 509. . . .114 
Finally, in order avoid overly burdening every cable system to negotiate with every copyright 
holder, Congress created a compulsory license system for cable. 115 
b. Internet Service Transmitters 
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Internet service transmitters are viewed differently by United States courts than cable 
systems. It is important to note that the Copyright Act defines performance in terms of 
contemporaneousness; according to the House Report, the following is the meaning of “perform” 
under the 1976 Act: 
. . . [T]he concepts of public performance and public display cover not only the initial 
rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is 
transmitted to the public. . . . thus. . . a cable television system is performing when it re-
transmits the broadcast to its subscribers. 116 
Under this definition, Internet service transmissions are in the act of performing, as opposed to a 
DVR, which simply enables its subscriber to perform at a later date. Matt Jackson, an assistant 
professor of communications at Penn State University, argued that the “exponential worldwide 
growth of the Internet” is a strong incentive for harmonization in copyright.117 Internet service 
transmitters that allow streaming are a large part of what makes the Internet appealing to 
consumers.  
Recently, the Ninth Circuit was presented with the question of whether an Internet 
transmission service should be treated as a cable company under §111 of the Copyright Act, and 
thus eligible for a compulsory license. In Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, LLC, 851 F.3d 
1002 (9th Cir. 2017), the defendant, FilmOn, used antennas to capture cable broadcast and then 
used the Internet to rebroadcast the programs, many of which were copyrighted.118 FilmOn did 
not obtain consent from the owners of the copyrighted work it was transmitting to its subscribers, 
and a group of cable broadcast stations and copyright holders (collectively, “FOX”), brought 
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suit.119 In response, FilmOn claimed that it was a “cable system” and thus eligible for a 
compulsory license.120 Under §111 of the Copyright Act, a “cable system” is: 
… [A] facility, located in any State, territory, trust territory, or possession of the United 
States, that in whole or in part receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one 
or more television broadcast stations licensed by the Federal Communications 
Commission, and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, 
cables, microwave, or other communications channels to subscribing members of the 
public who pay for such service.121 
Each party offered a different interpretation of the language of §111.122 Ultimately, the court 
concluded that deference to the Copyright Office’s position should control. The Copyright Office 
contends that Internet transmission services cannot be treated as cable systems.123  
In reaching this decision, the court reasoned that the Copyright Office has been charged with 
implementing the Copyright Act for many years, and has maintained this view consistently.124 
During this time, Congress has amended §111 in various ways, but has never altered any 
language that would make it clear that Internet transmission services are included under the 
category of “cable systems.”125 Thus, it was reasonable to conclude that Congress did not oppose 
the view held by the Copyright Office (although it has never explicitly endorsed it).126 
Notably, the Ninth Circuit included interesting dicta in deciding this case that implicate 
copyright globally: 
. . . [I]nterpreting § 111 so as to include Internet-based retransmission services would risk 
putting the United States in violation of certain of its treaty obligations. An age-old canon of 
construction instructs that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law 
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of nations if any other possible construction remains." Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 
6 U.S. 64, 118, 2 L. Ed. 208 (1804).”127 
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, Internet transmission services of television programs are less 
likely to be entitled to compulsory licenses due to current global copyright treaties.  
V. Copyright and Undercapitalized Nations 
In the United States, the goal of the Copyright Act is “to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts,” and in order to do so, the Act provides certain protections and incentives to 
copyright holders.128 As this is the United States Constitution, it is easily argues that the goal is 
to promote progress in these areas in the United States only. However, with the current 
connectivity of the world, the progress made in other nations helps the United States make 
progress as well. Unfortunately, developing countries are at a disadvantage in the realm of 
intellectual property. Scholars have recognized this, and agree that it is important to help 
promote the progress in science and other arts around the world, including in developing nations: 
. . . [D[eveloping countries need to disseminate knowledge on a wide basis. The artificial 
scarcity created by copyright law prevents the achievement of this goal. The high prices of 
works published overseas hamper the implementation of public policies for the extensive use 
of copyrighted works to promote educational, cultural, and technical development. Public 
purchases and voluntary licensing have not met those needs because the fees charged are 
unreasonable in the context of limited economic resources in developing countries.129 
Sunder also argued the need for developing countries to compete in the intellectual property 
market, focusing specifically on life-saving patented mediations.130 Although dramatic works are 
not a necessary as life-saving medication, the arts can provide a source of income to 
impoverished nations, and also promote general learning for the population. Intellectual property 
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as a whole is important to any community, as it embodies and also shapes much of a nation’s 
culture.  
 The Berne Convention offers some flexibility, such as allowing for developing countries 
to issue compulsory licenses for “translating and/or reproducing foreign works into languages of 
general use in their territories,”131 but these flexibilities are extremely limited in scope and are 
subject to a three part test in which the exceptions must be: “(1) limited to special cases, (2) do 
not conflict with normal exploitation of the work, and (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author.”132 Furthermore, “[t]his test prevents the extensive use of 
works by countries because, even if the policy rationale is more altruistic and urgent than 
providing mere entertainment in small restaurants, the test arguably disallows massive use of 
copyrighted works with regards to education.”133 
 Finally, the flexibilities and exceptions provided in the current Berne Convention are not 
clear in their applicability to digital works.134 The Internet is by far the fastest means of 
accessing and disseminating work, and without access to materials on the Internet, developing 
countries are stifled. The Berne Convention’s exceptions, referred to as the Appendix for 
purposes in this article, do not account for this: 
The provisions of the Appendix expressly limit their application to the non-digital 
environment, as they expressly allow the translation and reproduction of a given work "in 
printed or analogous forms of reproduction." This clause suggests that digital forms of 
reproduction are excluded from the scope of the Appendix.135 
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Consequently, developing countries that are slow in making progress in the useful arts and 
sciences experience a deficit of copyrighted material. 
VI. The Need for Harmonization 
a. The Flaws in Current International Treaties 
Attempts at harmonizing copyright law have been made in the form of international treaties, 
such as the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement. However, issues remain. Oftentimes a 
work remains protected in one nation but falls into the public domain of another.136 This lack of 
copyright uniformity creates problems for both consumers and copyright holders. One obvious 
problem is that a copyright holder loses the ability to benefit from the market in countries in 
which the copying of a particular work is legal. 137 However, a copyright owner also loses the 
ability to benefit from a foreign country’s market in a situation in which copies of their 
copyrighted works are transported into said country (without authorization), and copying in that 
country is illegal.138 On the flip side, consumers have a difficult time accessing certain works, 
and this stifles the spread of culture and ideas. Robert Spoo, a professor at the University of 
Tulsa College of Law, asserts that harmonization provides a solution to the issues created by an 
uncoordinated public domain: 
If copyright laws were uniform in all respects throughout the world, works would receive 
protection for a fixed number of years (most copyrights have limited terms) and then would 
enter a single, global public domain where they could be exploited by anyone anywhere 
without permission or risk of liability. But copyright laws are not uniform throughout the 
world.139 
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International treaties have made attempts to accomplish this, but have yet to succeed. However, 
as discussed above, there also exist problems in the dissemination of protected works. The Berne 
Convention provides for minimum standards, allowing countries to go much higher than that 
mandated by the treaty. This means that it will take some works much longer to fall into the 
public domain, and that deprives many developing countries, and even developed countries, from 
exploiting these works. Additionally, the Berne Convention neglects the Internet, a major 
component of globalization. A compulsory licensing system is a way to provide nations and their 
citizens with copyrighted works in a way that is more affordable.  
b. Compulsory Licensing and the Market 
This article has centered on the need for harmonization as a way to help disseminate 
ideas globally. The copyright systems works as an economic incentive for creation, and therefore 
is tied to the marketplace and its consumers. One critique of the ideas in this article may be that 
the market determines what is valuable in different regions, and if the consumers in England 
called for a particular foreign show, Amazon Prime would negotiate with copyright owners to 
get a license for the right to stream that show. This is true to an extent, but also fails when 
looking at the history and development of the compulsory license system for cable systems. The 
market failed to protect local cable providers, and that in turn lowered the return that copyright 
owners got from licenses purchased by those local cable providers.  Ultimately, the cable 
broadcasting network owners got a solution to their problem through Congress’ adoption of a 
compulsory license system in the 1976 Copyright Act. As a result, the local cable systems were 
able to fairly compete with large national cable providers. The same principles and logic may be 
applied to Internet service transmitters: if international treaties were to address the needs of these 
providers in international copyright treaties, they could compete on an international market. The 
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Internet connects the world, and yet is notably absent from the current international copyright 
treaties. At the present, the current copyright regime is enabling the cable distributers of 
copyrighted works a monopoly of sorts, not the copyright holders. Addressing Internet service 
transmitters and their television programming may be one small step towards harmonization and 
a fair competitive global market in that area. As previously mentioned, Matt Jackson argued that 
the “exponential worldwide growth of the Internet” is a strong incentive for harmonization in 
copyright.140  This conclusion is reasonable. Before, physical distance was an obstacle to 
spreading culture. Today, with the ability for individuals around the world to connect through the 
Internet, physical distance is no longer a problem. Instead, intellectual property geographic 
limitations are an impediment to the spread of culture. 
Regarding dramatic works, such as movies and television episodes, some of this uneven 
protection and distribution may be alleviated through compulsory licenses. However, the United 
States does not give Internet service transmitters the right to a compulsory license under § 111 of 
the Copyright Act141, so an example of distribution problems for Internet streaming already 
exists on a local, national level.  
According to the Ninth Circuit in the recent Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, LLC 
decision, Internet service transmitters are not cable systems.142 By this logic, services such as 
Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon Prime, each of which functions like sling technology, are not entitled 
to compulsory licenses in the United States. On services such as Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon 
Prime, the user is given the ability to both “time-shift” and “place shift.” Time-shifting, 
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according to Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. allows the user to view a 
specific audiovisual program at a time other than when it is originally broadcasted.143 Place-
shifting, according to Fox Broadcasting Co. v. DISH Network, LLC, allows the user to watch the 
program in any location they wish.144 With technologies such as VCR and DVR, the consumer is 
doing the performance, not the service provider. This is supported by the definition in the 
Copyright Act, which is concerned with contemporaneousness.145 However, this reasoning is 
inapposite to online streaming. In online streaming, the Internet service transmitter is rending the 
performance directly,146 but without the benefit of a compulsory license. This makes it much 
more expensive and much more difficult for these Internet services to legally gain access to 
copyrighted works, and legally provide access to copyrighted works, for their subscribers.  
On Amazon Prime, a subscriber has the ability to watch select programs whenever they 
so choose. Currently, however, subscribers cannot watch them wherever they want. Select 
programs that are copyrighted in the United States, and available on Amazon Prime in the United 
States, for example, are not available on Amazon Prime in England. Instead of providing the 
program, Amazon Prime provides its subscribers with the following notice:  
This video isn’t available due to geographical licensing restrictions. For more details, 
please refer to Amazon Video Terms of Use. For further assistance, please contact 
Customer Service at www.amazon.com/videohelp and refer to error 4601.147 
One specific example of a copyrighted television show that is available for streaming on Amazon 
Prime in the United States, but not in England, is the television series Psych. The television show 
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is comedy mystery, in which the main character is an amateur detective that pretends to have 
psychic powers, and is hired by the police to help them solve crimes.148 The first episode of the 
first season was aired in 2006,149 and it was copyrighted in 2007 by Universal Studios. In the 
United States, a work made for hire is protected for either ninety-five years after publication, or 
one hundred and twenty years after creation (whichever is shorter)150, and therefore this work is 
still protected by copyright. The United States and United Kingdom are each signatories to the 
Berne Convention.151 The Berne Convention requires a minimum term of protection of fifty 
years from publication for cinematographic work.152 In the United Kingdom, dramatic works are 
protected for seventy years after the death of the author.153 This applies to specific authors: 
Works only qualify for UK copyright protection if the author qualifies or the country in 
which the work was first published is a qualifying country or, in the case of broadcasts, 
the place of transmission qualifies. This means a work is protected by UK copyright law 
only if it was made by a British author or a person who is a national of a country to which 
the CDPA 'applies' or it was first published in the UK or a country to which the CDPA 
'applies' or, in the case of broadcasts, it was made in or sent from the UK or a country to 
which the CDPA 'applies'.154 
However, since the United Kingdom is a member of the Berne Convention, it is required to give 
a work copyrighted in the United States the same protection that it would grant a work authored 
in the United Kingdom.155 Amazon Prime informs its subscribers that geographical licensing 
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restrictions prevent the availability of particular works in particular locations. Netflix offers an 
explanation as to why its subscribers experience this lack of selection depending on their 
location: 
Studios enforce copyright by country, as different markets have different demands for 
specific content. . . . Netflix and the studios both understand this, and the studios charge 
more for Netflix to offer streaming of specific titles in some countries compared to 
others. Because the content deals are country specific, Netflix may choose to pay the 
studio-demanded price to stream a title in one country, while negotiations in other regions 
fall flat.156 
Without compulsory licensing, Internet service transmitters are forced to negotiate prices for 
each type of exclusive right to creative works, such as the right to public performance and the 
right of distribution. Cable systems have a competition advantage in the form of compulsory 
license, arguably a form of a monopoly on compulsory licenses for television programs. 
Allowing Internet services a compulsory license will help level the playing field, just as the 
playing field was previously leveled to allow local cable broadcasters to compete with national 
broadcasters.157 
 As mentioned previously, the Berne Convention mandates minimal standards and 
includes a rule of shorter term, but these approaches have not eliminated the problem of 
inconsistent protection throughout the globe. Robert Spoo argues that a compulsory license 
system, if fashioned correctly, may function better than the current approaches taken by the 
Berne Convention: “In contrast to the rule of the shorter term, the compulsory-license system 
would have to be designed to overrule any inconsistent international principals, bilateral treaties, 
or national laws that would defeat the operation of such a world-harmonizing rule.”158 
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 Revisiting the Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller decision, the Ninth Circuit, in ruling 
against defendant FilmOn, provided dicta as to why the court believed that Internet service 
transmitters should not be granted compulsory licenses: it would violate certain treaty obligations 
of the United States.159 It is true that the Berne Convention does not provide for a compulsory 
licensing system, and although the Court did not reference any single treaty specifically, it is 
possible that the Court had international treaties in mind here. If so, the implication of 
compulsory licensing for Internet service transmissions within international treaties may alter 
this interpretation by U.S. courts.  
 The above example focused on Amazon Prime, specifically in the market of the United 
Kingdom. Expenses have dissuaded Amazon Prime from paying for the rights for certain works 
in certain locations. Here, the location in question is far from that of a developing country, and 
yet access to certain copyrighted works is still restricted. This problem would be much worse in 
developing countries. Although dramatic works are not life-saving like patented medications are, 
dissemination of culture and ideas is still important for countries around the world.160 
Compulsory licenses for Internet transmissions will help the spread of information and culture, 
even if it is merely in the form of a television program. Psych may not be considered vital for the 
spread of science and useful arts in the views of some individuals, but this same problem is 
applicable to various other television programs and movies, such as scientific and historical 
documentaries. 
Unfortunately, a system of compulsory licenses for dramatic works disseminated through 
the Internet comes with flaws as well. This decreased the amount of compensation the copyright 
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holder will get for the exploitation of their work. Additionally, this diminishes the copyright 
holders’ right to decide which markets they would like to distribute their works. However, if the 
goal is to spread copyright works to the public, and to promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts, compulsory licenses are one way of accomplishing this goal as they make paying for 
the licenses much more feasible.  
VII. Conclusion 
The United States Constitution provides authors of creative works certain protections and 
rights as an incentive to create.161 This is designed “to promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts.”162 Arguably, Congress’ goal was to promote the progress in these areas exclusively 
in the United States, but just as other nations can benefit from the progress made by the United 
States, so too can the United States benefit from the progress of other nations. Today, the 
Internet provides a fast and easy way to spread information, but some aspects of copyright law 
inhibit this free flow of ideas and creative works. The market has not solved the problem, 
arguably because of an unfair advantage granted to cable systems in the form of compulsory 
licenses. Currently, neither the United States Copyright Act nor international treaties allow 
dramatic works disseminated through Internet service transmissions the benefits of compulsory 
licenses. The market does not appear to be an adequate solution to this problem, just as it did not 
provide a solution to cable systems in the 1950s. The minimum terms mandated by the Berne 
Convention ensure that works stay protected for a significant amount of time. Compulsory 
licenses may help to spread copyrighted works, while still providing some compensation to the 
copyright holder, and create fair competition.  
                                                          
161 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution 
162 Id.  
